The perceived Islamic threat that is becoming increasingly popular with some segments of the American foreign policy establishment, and being spinned by the media, needs to be examined and stripped of some of its myths. The threat is rooted in both real and imaginary factors because of biases, misperceptions, and vested political motives, by analysts of Islam, political commentators and policy makers. However, this idea in a post Cold War World serves the US and some western European nations foreign policy goals. As a result there must be a separation of myth and reality, through the establishment of some elementary points which would include the fact that Islam is not one phenomena, but many; that Islamic states have not posed a strategic threat to the West since the 18th century; and that the issues underlying the uprisings in specific Middle Eastern countries are one of internal development and political change. Lumping all Islamic groups together as a monolithic force bent on confrontation with the West is thus a fallacious assumption. These movements and the Muslim world are diverse in its ideological, racial and ethnic makeup, and the idea, moreover, that Islam is one ummah is a myth. Fred Halliday interestingly highlights the fragmentation among Muslims in the Middle East, Europe and Asia when he points out the differences defined by sects, political affiliation, ethnicity, and language.
The contemporary Middle East is a mosaic of national, ethnic, religious and ideological groups, competing for power and influence. In its diversity, different Muslim sects such as the Shites, Druze in Lebanon, Alawites in Syria, Turks, Arabic and Farsi speaking secularists, monarchists and Islamists, all compete for power and influence. Although this unity is preached by many Arab nationalists and Islamists it has never been a reality of Muslim history. Yet, when convenient, Islam, Arabs and Muslims are represented as a monolithic bloc confronting the West.
Disunity emerged in the body politic of Islam immediately after the death of the prophet Muhammad, leading to a schism among the early Muslims about his successor. Some of his followers believed in hereditary leadership and wanted Ali, his son-in-law, to become the spiritual and political leader of the nascent Muslim community. Since there was no hereditary leadership in Islam, others maintained that the most competent person (male) amongst Mohammed’s companions should become the leader. This schism was the first divisive issue in the body politic of Islam, eventually leading to a war among the early Muslims. Subsequent developments in the Muslim world showed that disunity, conflict and political rivalry, was a constant feature of Muslim history. As Hashemi points out: "by the mid 8th century dar-al-Islam (the realm of Islam) was fragmented into a number of independent, frequently hostile principalities that did not hesitate to find allies in dar-al-harb (realm of war)for their wars with each other."
Contemporary examples in the Islamic world indicate that this discord and division is ongoing. Because of the claims of Islam, for example the idea of a universal brotherhood and ummah, the Islamic world is often give a unity by outsiders which in reality it lacks. Islam is seen as an emotion ruled monolith that moves as one power. Writing about the "Coming Great Powers Competition" after communism, Henricksen argues that neither the Middle East, nor Islam are cohesive or powerful to give reasons for superpower status, but the religious resurgence is significant to be seen as a major force in discussing international rivalries. In fact, for him, the diversity, disunity and nationalism in the Muslim world militates against a Huntington and Lewis-type clash of Islamic civilizations with other world cultures, particularly the West. The rivalries are clear in the Middle East where Egypt contends with Syria for leadership of the Arab world, and the former shows its hostility towards Sudan and Libya. The Gulf war in 1992 highlighted the disunity and division of the Arab/Muslim world, where some supported the US military coalition, while others rallied behind Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq. Moreover,during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s, Islamic solidarity was disproved when the Shias in Iraq refused to heed Ayatollah Khomeini’s call to rise up against Saddam Hussein, leader of a Sunni majority state, and support the revolution. The appeals to prevent genocide of Muslim Bosnians by Christian Serbs, and the Soviet Union aggression against Afghanistan, are other instances of the failure of Muslim cooperation and unity of purpose.
Too often Islamists groups are lumped together as a single threat to Western interests. This simplistic, unfair and misleading notion and image ignores the variance amongst them, and implicitly assumes that they are the only anti-western groups in their societies. The Islamic revivalism is an umbrella for a diverse variety and disorganized political aspect of this religion which is only "one of the many and multifaceted element in the colorful Middle Eastern tapestry that the end of the Cold War is unfolding." While Islamic political activism in the Middle East has the potential to change the political landscape in the region, the reality is that it is a fragmented ideology having many interpretations. Each Islamic movement must be viewed within the differing socio-political, economic and cultural environments of specific Muslim nation states. Even within specific countries, Islamists groups exhibit great disagreements in ideology, methods of operation against existing ruling elites, and their relations with the West. Some seek to achieve power through peaceful ways and are part of the political process in many countries, such as the Welfare Party in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Egypt. Others such as the Jihad and Takfir groups in Egypt, and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria operate in secret cells and perpetuate indiscriminate acts of violence. Some are traditional and fanatical, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, while others are urban and sophisticated, like the Refah in Turkey and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria.
The central point is that Islamists are not organized who speak with one ideological voice, bent on confronting the West, or for that matter secular ruling elites in the Middle East. There is little chance of regional Islamic unity and coordination against common enemies and on certain issues affecting the global Muslim community. Discussing the relationship between political Islam and Europe, Robertson states:
There are many different Islamists interpretations and strategies. The groups that fall under the Islamists umbrella are prone to splintering and have found it difficult to cooperate and coordinate, although this aspect may be overcome to some extent. Even so it is unlikely to lead to unity or mergers of Islamists groups.
Contemporary Afghanistan is an interesting example where Islamists
groups splintered after the Soviet army’s withdrawal. During the Soviet
occupation of the country, different factions and tribes cooperated, uniting
under the banner of Islam against a common enemy: the Red Army. However,
after the enemy’s defeat the Islamic groups fragmented into numerous factions,
fighting and competing for power. Today Afghanistan is a wasteland and
ungovernable, where a variety of Islamic and secular groups see it fit
to solve the country’s problems through the barrel of a gun. The FIS in
Algeria experienced a similar breakup after the military junta denied them
the fruits of their political victory. A fanatical faction, the GIA, involved
in violent terror and indiscriminate acts against individuals in Algerian
society, broke away from the FIS, bent on seizing power by force. A moderate
FIS, on the other hand, is still prepared to seek a peaceful settlement
with the military junta.
Muslim Bloc Or Pragmatism
Commentators, fueling the monolithic Islamic menace, neglect to note that Muslim states (even the Islamic states like Iran and Sudan) have national interests which often differ. Once in power Islamists demonstrate a high degree of pragmatism, despite the alarmists views of some, where they have established regimes, they have not explored expansionist policies. On the contrary, they have been essentially defensive, more preoccupied with the consolidation of power, economic stability, and looking for greater autonomy, than historical circumstances have allowed.
In pursuit of their own economic well-being and national security, Muslim states have also attempted to form alliances, which is customary strategy for states. They have to deal with problems of delivering the social and economic goods, such as housing, employment, social services and the like to their populace, to maintain their legitimacy. Hence, although Islamic movements can create problems in the Middle East, they do not threaten Europe, because Islam by and large have no conquering or expansionists ambitions outside the confines of the Muslim world. The Islamic Republic in Iran wanted to export the revolution when it come to power, but 18 years later it is still preoccupied with internal problems to implement revolutionary ambitions.
The idea of a united Muslim empire emerging in a post - Cold War Middle East challenging the West, or other civilization for that matter, and moving with unity of purpose is misleading. The Muslim world is deeply divided, too poor to think of an onslaught against the West. Moreover, in the Middle East the deep rootedness of the modern state, as Piscatori argues, militates against this idea, Indeed over the centuries of historical experience and evolution of theory, Muslims have largely freed themselves of a model which denigrates territorial pluralism and demands monolithic unity.
The Islamic movement, furthermore, manifesting their opposition against corrupt and authoritarian regimes, is not there to disrupt the international interstate relations. They support the universal idea of peace amongst states. For example, all Muslim states, including Sudan and Iran, are members of the United Nations and other international organizations. The national interests of Muslims countries indicating the diversity and pragmatism, rather than Islamic unity among Muslims, is also reflected in foreign policy. The Islamic ruling party in Turkey is an example of this reality. In power, pragmatism dictated foreign policy when it maintained a military treaty with Israel, an arch enemy of the Islamists movements. Sudan, similarly, displayed this pragmatism when it refused Iranian suggestions not to support Iraq during the Gulf War. Moreover, Iran, is sympathetic towards Armenia in its war with Azerbaijan, because it fears a strong and stable regime in Azerbaijan, having the potential to stir up nationalist undercurrents amongst the 20 million Azeris living in Iran.
Just as the Muslim world and the Islamic movement today are disunited, so it has been throughout the centuries. Each Islamic movement is defined and determined by national states and rival political factions; some are moderate while others are extremists and commit violent acts. The problems a particular society confronts, furthermore, determines the form the Islamic movement takes. In Syria, for instance, the Islamic movement manifest itself in the sectarian divide, seen in a Sunni confrontation, challenging an Alawite (a Muslim heretical sect) ruling political class. Therefore, remaining diverse and defined by individual state interests, Muslims and Islamic groups are more likely to confront and squabble among each other, than unite to solve a problem confronting the Muslim ummah.
Part of the Third World, Muslim states remain much weaker than the industrialized West. Today the combined military strength is far less than that of the former , even assuming that Muslim states form an alliance to act in unison. Armies in the developed countries of Western Europe and the US are far superior in technology and better organized. But what if Islamists came to power in Middle Eastern countries, will they threaten the West? This is highly unlikely, because concerns and priorities of Islamic movements are with issues in the Muslim world; to find solutions to the problems of underdevelopment, poverty, and unemployment. Where the outside world concerns them, is when it contributes to these problems in the Muslim world, such as the American, British and French occupation of Iraq, armies stationed in Saudi Arabia, the arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims, and US financial and military aid of authoritarian regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Political Islamists movements are cultural and nationalist responses to problems facing their societies; hence whether in Iran, Morocco, Turkey or Egypt, the anger of Islamists are directed against indigenous, colonial states, rather than foreign domination.
Islamic Threat Or Threat To Islam
Whereas political commentators, geostrategists and the media in the US and Western Europe tend to view and depict Islam as an aggressive and hostile force, Muslims see the latter as the main threat to their culture, values, territory and lives. Aggressive acts by the West are borne out the memories of the medieval Crusaders, the inquisition in Spain in the 14th century, and the yoke of colonial rule during the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 1990’s Muslims feelings of insecurity, powerlessness and paranoia regarding the aggressive intentions of the West are bolstered by highly destructive international conflicts, ranging from Bosnia, Chechneya and the Gulf War, where Muslims have suffered incalculable human and material losses. Far from being a unified power that is "about to reach the gates of Vienna and the shores of Spain, it is in fact, currently on the defensive against militant anti-Muslim fundamentalists." Muslims see the goal of the secular Christians as to outright eradicate their communities and culture, and as evidence, they point to the genocide in Bosnia, committed in civilized Europe, cradle of human rights and democracy
The establishment of Israel by the West and the usurpation of Palestinian land, unwavering US support for the former, and authoritarian regimes such as Egypt repressing the Islamists, further intensify Muslim fear, paranoia and humiliation. Instead of being on the offensive against the West, Muslims are trying to keep out the awesome power and influence of Western culture, ideas and consumerism, and economic dependency transmitted through satellite television, Hollywood movies and aggressive marketing and advertising by Multinational Corporations.
The Islamic challenge so often depicted in the West as aggressive or militant, emerges consistently in Islamic literature as a defensive reaction to the violence of the State. For Muslims the secular state in the Middle East is supported economically and militarily by the West. Thus this view of an anti-Muslim, pro-Western government bent on denying Muslim populations their right to self determination and a rightful place in international society is heightened. The demonization and stereotypes in the media, about Islam and in the Muslim world, upsets Muslims. This media hysteria and sensationalism fuels anti-Muslim feelings, manifesting attacks against Muslims in Europe, especially France and Germany. Far from being united, powerful and commanding respect in the international arena, Muslims and the Islamic world are on the defensive against "anti-Muslimism," in a world dominated by western ideas of secularism, liberalism, pluralism and consumerism.
The country persistently vilified and identified, with Islamic terrorism, by Western policy makers and Middle Eastern governments, is the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Clinton administration on numerous occasions accused Iran of sponsoring international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. New phrases used by the Clinton administration to describe Iran are: rogue state; center of extremism, and Islamic fundamentalism. Anthony Lake, assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, for example, accuses Iran of being the "foremost sponsor of terrorism and assassinations worldwide. In many instances, where a bomb goes off in the world, Iran is accused of being responsible or having a hand in it. Whether it was the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in the US, the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, or the recent TWA plane crash over New York, the Iranian link was immediately declared by US State Department officials in Washington DC, and hyped by the US media.
A main accusation, furthermore, by the Clinton Administration and Israel is the alleged training of Islamic terrorists by Iran. These individuals and groups range from the radical Islamic group, Hamas, in the occupied territories of Palestine, to the GIA in Algeria, allegedly trained in Sudan by Iranian agents Without furnishing any solid evidence of this accusations, John Esposito, a western academic on the Middle East, at a conference on US-Iran relations in Washington DC, in September of 1993, pointed out this irony, when he said:
What is fascinating to me, is that after a year and a half of talking about Iran’s influence in Sudan and given the capabilities of our intelligence services and the self interests of many governments in the region, no one is coming forward with significant evidence about the size and numbers of these camps.
By accusing Iran of being the main training ground for international Islamic extremists, the Islamic threat is immersed in the Iranian threat.
Many observers in the West, Asia and the Middle East would identify that the Islamic Republic of Iran supports militant revolutionary groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, give material support to militant Islamic groups worldwide, regularly condemn the Arab-Israeli peace process and have a deplorable human rights record. But their misdeeds as identified by the US is not unique in the Middle East. Competing with Iran, in supporting and financing radical Islamic groups in the Middle East and other parts of the world, is Saudi Arabia and Syria. Iran has been vociferous in condemning the Arab-Israeli peace process, but at other times much of the Arab world has done the same. However, although there is disapproval of the peace process, president Ali Rafsanjani on June 7, 1994 at a press conference said that Iran "does not want to intervene in practice and physically disrupt the process."
A closer scrutiny of Iran’s foreign policy indicates that it is pragmatic, concerned with its own national interests, and not Pan-Islamic solidarity. Maintaining the status quo in the region is an important foreign policy objective. Surrounded by unstable governments, like Iraq, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Central Asia and Afghanistan, it seeks stability in the area by initiating peace talks and dialogue with the warring factions. In addition, it joined Turkey and Syria to discuss ways of preventing Kurdish nationalism upsetting regional stability. In an attempt to counteract American hegemony in the Persian Gulf the mullahs in Teheran are calling for a regional axis of China, India and Iran. Demonstrating a good understanding of international relations the regime in Iran basically made Washington’s policy of dual containment ineffective. Banning all commercial transactions with Iran, the policy is an attempt to isolate Iran internationally and weaken its economy. However, America’s European allies are not following Washington’s dictates, insisting on economic and diplomatic links and a "critical dialogue" policy with Iran.
The idea of Iran leading an international Islamic Comintern is misguided and mischievous. For one, being Persian and Shia, it has its own struggle and historical animosity with the Sunni Arabs and Turks. Although many Islamic movements are inspired by the Iranian revolution, this Shia theocracy has not had much influence on Islamic movements in the Sunni Middle East. In most cases, as in Algeria and Egypt, the popularity of Islamic movements is a direct result of corrupt ruling classes alienated from the masses, and economic mismanagement, not because of any action on the part of Iran.
The limited economic and military power of Tehran place constraints on it becoming a major global power, and other regional powers, such as Pakistan, Turkey and regional Arab states, can contain Iranian expansion. While there is a strong religious component in its foreign policy, military and economic interests outweighs support for a global Islamic revolution. To rebuild and develop their economy after the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic regime is in desperate need of financial and foreign investment from the West, Japan and other countries. The mullahs would more likely behave than export its terrorism, and radical brand of Islam, since "it is in dire economic straits and now has to be careful about further isolating itself from the rest of the world," says Geoffrey Kemp, an expert on Iran. They learnt a painful lesson, that it cannot continue its Islamic radicalism, without suffering further economic decline and international isolation. Accordingly after the death of Khomeini in 1989 Iran moderated its foreign policy. Moderation will likely continue, because "Irans economy is in severe disarray and as a result, the Republic faces the possibility of serious social unrest."
Weak and economically crippled it is, therefore, hard to believe that Iran could create a vast network of underground training and support activities, and then use it for so many different goals around the world to create a so called global Intifada. Refuting the idea that Iran is controlling, directing and funding a global Islamic network and spreading radical Islam across the Middle East, Leon Hadar argues:
The condition of Iran today resembles that of the Soviet Union at the beginning of its decline; a bankrupt economy, dissatisfied population, ethnic rivalries, and an official ideology, that does not respond to the needs of the citizens. Iran cannot serve as a "model" for other Muslim societies or as a "magnet" for Shiite groups in the region.
Iran’s opening to the West, is motivated by the same concerns which led the rigid Chinese leadership to establish diplomatic relations with the US a few years ago: the need to improve their nation’s diplomatic and economic position. Demonstrating pragmatism and expediency in its foreign policy, it belies the accusation by the US that is the center of a new communism, and global Islamic threat bent on confrontation with the West and exporting Islamic terror.
The mythology of an Islamic threat must be seen in the context of the end of the Cold War, with the threat of global communism diminished , Cold War geostrategists in the West, especially in the US state department, searched for a new bogeyman. Shifting the focus to the Third World, policy makers, aided by the media, constructed a new menace to the US dominated international political and economic system, in the form of dictators, rogue states, narcotrafficers, and most important, Islamic fundamentalists. The emergence of a multi-polar world system, where new and old world views, and cultural forces are reasserting themselves as never before, means that Washington’s Middle East policy, must change to adapt to new changes in the region.
In a post-Cold War world, the Middle East features prominently in US foreign policy concerns. America and Western Europe’s dependency on oil from the Persian Gulf, and the resurgence of political Islam, challenging US imperialism and hegemony in the region, are major reasons for United States foreign policy objectives to adapt to new political, social and economic changes in the region. According to Amirahmadi, Washington’s foreign policy in the region are:
Since the overwhelming majority of Americans are ignorant, and ill-informed about Islam and the Middle East, distorted information focusing on images of violence, encourages negative and ethnocentric interpretations. In this way the media’s dehumanization of Muslims and Arabs can serve to pave the way for interventionist policies. By perpetuating the myths, and failing to cover the region and religion objectively, the media does not play the role of a fourth estate, as it so often claims, but contributes to the foreign policy aims of Washington.
All the major players, from the West particularly the US, Iran, Israel, the Arab governments and the Islamic movements, have a major, stake in changing the course of events in the region. It is in nobody’s interest to increase conflict and instability and waste resources. A new approach, according to Hooshang Amirahmadi, "would promote comprehensive regional peace, political stability, and economic justice; it would account for the concerns and interests of all involved within a framework of compromise and compassion."
This requires that all interested parties develop a willingness to have dialogue, negotiate, cooperate and compromise within a framework of mutual respect and cooperation. However, the present policy of the US, being the most powerful and influential player in the region, militates against such a approach. Its policy in the Middle East, particularly toward political Islam - by conjuring up a new menace, - is shortsighted, hypocritical and does not serve its interests. President Clinton should resist the pressures from interested political groups and foreign agents to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. Searching, and creating fundamentalists to confront and destroy, will involve major costs for the United States. Why,for example, should the United States continue to police the Persian Gulf for the Europeans and the Japanese, who are more dependent on oil, while they beat America in global trade competition?
To find a realistic way out of the hypocrisy, cultural biases and to accommodate their vital interests and the interests of the people of the Middle East, western governments, especially the Clinton administration, should consider a few guidelines. First they should seek to know: who the Islamists groups are; why they are involved in violence in the region; and what their aspirations are. This cannot be achieved if the West views Islamists as a challenge and security risk. Lumping the latter and the Islamic resurgence as a monolithic threat to Western interests is misleading, since neither Islam, or resurgent Islam is anti-western. Anti-western rhetoric and attitudes by Islamic movements are not directed at Christianity or western civilization as such, but are a reaction to western policies, especially Washington’s support for authoritarian regimes, and the long history of military intervention and interference in their countries.
A policy by Washington, where it disengages from repressive regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, will ensure that new regimes - Islamists or others - which come to power will not direct its hostility and wrath against the US. As the main backer of these authoritarian regimes, Washington should encourage them to accommodate and moderate Islamic forces. Political Islam either at its most extreme, or at its most progressive, is still a minority movement, clearly gaining strength, which cannot be ignored. Around for 1500 years, Islam shows no signs of spiritual collapse and is not going to disappear by repression. The American administration should use its political influence to be an honest broker, to help initiate a democratization process, which will advance political pluralism, democracy, freedom, and economic growth in the Middle East. Cutting aid to autocratic regimes, will force rulers to reform their political system. America’s interests lies not in isolating Islamic movements, but by working through communication and trade.
Instead of arguing that Islamists are anti-democratic, it should recognize that the western concept of secular democracy is not universal. Muslim societies with its own value systems should establish democracies with an Islamic face, and not Westminster type of pluralist democracies. The United States rhetoric about Islamists being anti-democratic has little to do with concerns over the status of liberty in the Middle East. This rhetoric is used to mobilize support for pliant pro-western regimes and military intervention in the region, in particular its access to oil.
Rather than be obsessed with dominance in the Middle East, the West should take a long term view of its dependency and interests, such as oil, and build more lasting relations with Islamic movements, who will inevitably come to power, or be opposition groups in many Middle Eastern countries. Emphasis should be on mutual respect and cross cultural understanding, instead of stereotypes, prejudice and demonization. Academics like Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, overemphasizing the "clash of civilizations" idea, ignores the creative and constructive interaction of civilizations throughout history. Centuries of interaction, for example, between the world of Islam and Europe, laid the foundation for the growth of science, math, architecture, and medicine in the West. Today, Asian, Muslim and other Third World societies benefit tremendously from scientific and intellectual knowledge from the First World. Rather than posing a threat or challenge to the West, Islamic activists and leaders value western Europe and America for its rule of law, protection of human rights, tolerance, absence of media censorship, and for its political and religious freedoms. Indeed the Muslim youth and others are calling at home, within the cultural confines, for what they learned and experienced while studying in the West.
Muslim anti-western propaganda and rhetoric which confirm some of the western stereotypes about Islam, should not be overlooked. Islamists reject western values of secularism, democracy, the rule of civil law. These movements espouse gross generalizations about the Western society which is labeled corrupt, decadent, immoral and sick, and in other contexts are committed to a long term moral struggle with them. In this way Muslims provoke the idea of the other and the corruption of the non-Muslim. Those who justify hostility towards Islam, argue that it is Muslims who are aggressive and prejudiced, and deserve the opposition it produced. However, as much as this anti-Western rhetoric is displayed, nowhere in the Muslim world is the idea peddled that Islam should confront the West in a holy war (jihad), and bring them to Islam. On the contrary for the last few decades Islam has been on the defensive from this awesome power.
In a modern world becoming more interdependent because of the globalization of the world economy, and global communications, western society, with the assistance of the powerful mass media, should begin to examine the shared values and principles of the great monolithic religions including secular liberalism, which is based on freedom, tolerance and human rights. These commonalties, rather than differences, should be emphasized, enhancing cooperation, respect and dialogue in international affairs. Because of the focus on differences, centuries of mistrust and conflict, has led to dislike of Islam in the West. Additionally, Islamic leaders, who have a strong influence in the way their constituents view the other should make a conscious effort to reduce their stereotypical and prejudice attitude of moral superiority vis-a -vis the West and non-Muslim cultures in general.