The reasons for the Islamic resurgence are multidimensional, representing a diverse and complex phenomena, that can only be properly understood within a socio-historical context, and as part of the process of social change taking place in the Arab countries. Interpretations of the resurgence vary, and many Western analysts and scholars view it in the context of crisis experienced by Muslim societies. These societies, they argue, are in the midst of transformation that create tensions and crisis which must be resolved. Identifying a number of key issues for being the source of these crisis, Muslims reacted by a reaffirmation to Islam. Others see it as a religio-ideological crisis adjusting to the needs of modern society. Having suppressed and offended the religious feeling of majority in the name of a secular ideal such as nationalism, development, socialism and modernization, regimes caused the eruption of a dominant force.
Although the religious dimensions are important factors for the resurgence, it is the development and modernization crisis in the modern secular state which is the central cause, but not the only, of the Islamic resurgence. The Islamic resurgence is a complex and multifarious happening that cannot be explained by a single, or few factors. Both secular ruling elites in the Muslim countries and Islamic groups have assisted and helped the revivalism, and it seems that the use of Islam by governments in Muslim countries involves primarily the problem of legitimization. Encouraging Islamic groups as a legitimacy device, it is a diversionary tactic by these regimes to divert public attention from other issues such as unemployment, economic stagnation, lack of essential services, and to discredit their opponents, especially those to the left. The use of Islamic symbols and language by Islamic groups and movements on the other hand, reflects the reaction of a social group, or groups, to a threat, real or perceived, to its interests or value system. In both cases, Islamic resurgence is related to a social crisis. Dekmejian outlines the attributes of the crisis as follows: "a crisis of legitimacy of political elites and political systems; a paucity of social justice; an excessive reliance on coercion; military vulnerability; and the disruptive impact of modernization." Furthermore, a combination of structural factors, national crisis, foreign penetration and humiliation, military defeats, and an intellectual and spiritual malaise, class conflict and individual alienation, as a result of urbanization, all contributed to the resurgence.
Modernization And Development Crisis
The disruptive and transformative impact of modernization and development are identified by many scholars and experts, writing about political Islam, as the most important contributing factor to the Islamic revival. Affected by the expansion of the global economy, and encouraged by the new ruling elites espousing Arab nationalism and socialism, a development and modernization process impacted Middle Eastern societies in areas of education, the economy, industry, communication and also urbanization. However, the contemporary modernization projects initiated by the secular elites were inconclusive. Rather than leading to independence, self sufficiency and autonomy, these models increased economic dependency on the outside world, perpetuated its backwardness and underdevelopment. Moreover, modernization in the Arab and Muslim world, as Yapp shows, took its characteristics forms. Politically it was marked by a great increase in power of government; economically it was signaled by a decline in the reactive importance of agriculture, the rise of industry and services, and the shift of people from countryside to town; and socially it was exhibited in the proliferation of main education and the weakening of the traditional compartmentalization of society. The principal spurs of this modernization were the exuberant increase of population and the existence of internal and external threats to the security of states; the principal agencies of modernization were the states themselves. In this sense the Middle East, influenced by Islamic culture, is not different to other parts of the developing world in terms of the influences and processes of modernization.
This increase in population and the massive rural urban migration, with all its sociopolitical and economic transformations, is central in understanding the dynamics of the resurgence, which is primarily an urban reality. Modernization and economic transformation changes through urbanization now freed groups of people from previous obligations, and allowed them to participate in national and international politics, manifesting itself in the Islamic resurgence. The involvement of the masses in politics through modernization, most conspicuously in the form of urbanization, makes the revival different from those in the 19th and early 20th century. Because of mass migration to the urban centers, large communities held in check by economic and political elites in the countryside, moved into an arena with potential for mass political participation., which is Authentic and part of their traditional legacy, an Islamic identity is the choice for the urban masses who are alienated, disillusioned, and frustrated with the bankrupt secular political ideologies which are unable to better and strengthen their societies.
As in many other parts of the Third World, urbanization transformed the socioeconomic and political environment of Arab societies. The lack of employment, social services and housing shortages are the consequence of the growth of massive urban centers, serving as a destabilizing factor in the Middle East. Documenting this urbanization process, Lewis Snider observes that between 1960 and 1975 the rate of increase in the urban population exceeded the growth of the industrial labor force in Egypt by 2%, Iran by 3%, Iraq by 8%, Jordan by 18%, Kuwait by 14% Lebanon by 5%, Morocco by 10%, Saudi Arabia by 11%, Syria by 3% and South Yemen by 13%. This rising level of urbanization, coupled with deteriorating stagnant economies, and a rapidly declining and young population, a large number of un- and under-employed add up to a recipe for political instability. In the cities most migrants quickly became the urban poor, living in slums on the periphery of the city, feeling alienated in a strange environment. Often a strain, disruptive and unsettling for thousands of newly urbanized migrants, this movement from countryside to city, weakens the traditional sources of solidarity, causing identity problems and feelings of anomie
Such disruptions and dislocations from familiar surroundings make people in the Middle East seek common and traditional cultural religious symbols and identities, which is Islam. Because the government is unable to protect and provide them shelter and other services, these marginalized areas are fertile ground for the dissemination of revivalists ideology and recruitment to Islamic organizations. Modernization, through urban growth, now involved the masses in politics manifested in the Islamic revival, makes it different to previous ones in the last two centuries, since urbanization led to a "formation of a reaction different from those of the 19th and 20th century elites." The fact that the contemporary Islamic revivalism is an urban phenomenon shows that the process of urbanization is an important catalyst for the Muslim masses in the Middle East choosing a political identity.
Most of the Arab states witnessing an Islamic revival, although not having enjoyed an oil boom, show evidence of development in areas of industry, communication and education. Accompanying these developments were the hopes and aspiration of many sectors of the population, especially the middle strata; but the state exhausted financially and military, could not offer young people and new migrants from the rural areas jobs and housing. This development crisis whereby many new social and political forces have been unleashed without their energies being politically absorbed, and without their economic and social expectations being met and satisfied, is the surge behind Islamic revivalism. These forces were the classes most closely attached to the traditional social and moral value system identified with Islam. A large component of this group was the upward mobile, formally educated and urbanized youth, who were not completely assimilated and rewarded by the state because of incomplete industrialization and unfulfilled modernization programs. Another sector of this class was the peasants and other rural migrants who settled in the cities. Drawn into the process of rapid urbanization with limited employment opportunities, and cut of from familiar roots of family, they experienced social and political alienation and disorientation. Seeking stability, a sense of purpose, and wanting to preserve their identities,culture and values in an unfamiliar environment, they turned to familiar symbols and traditions: Islam.
The Crisis Of Political Legitimacy
Since the turn of the 20th century the introduction and adaptation of the nation state system, and western secular political ideologies, created an ongoing crisis of political legitimacy and identity in Arab Muslim countries. Imported from the West, modern secular ideologies, such as liberalism and socialism, failed to solve the spiritual and material needs of these societies. On the contrary it perpetuated its backwardness, dependency and underdevelopment, and Muslims who are familiar with the legacy of their great civilization and achievements, blame their miserable conditions on the imitative Western models which failed to liberate them. Threatening their traditions, it has not delivered the socioeconomic goods, improved these conditions for them, and has not been able to forge a national identity for the nation. In oil producing states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf States, rampant corruption, bogus legal systems, ineffective armies, mismanaged economies and dependency on the US have eroded the legitimacy of these regimes. Similarly, in North Africa, bankrupt states economies continue to provide benefits to the politically corrupt ruling class. Consequently, Pan Arabism, Arab nationalism, liberalism and socialist ideologies that enthralled the Arab masses in the 1960's and 1970's lost their mass appeal, and Islam is emerging as an alternative and guiding political ideology.
Many of the middle and lower class attracted to political Islam, see these discredited ideologies unable to deliver their basic needs such as jobs, housing and social services, repel foreign domination and break the dependency on the West. For them neither "Ataturkism" in Turkey, and the "White Revolution" in Iran, nor the Baathist varieties of "Arab socialism" seem to have delivered what was promised. Using Islamic religious symbols and idioms, the petite bourgeois express their resentment to corruption, decadence, inequality, and hostility to the secular governments which embody these evils. This Islamic language represents a broad alternative system of meaning and power to the existing sociopolitical structures which inevitably marginalize and alienates certain individuals and groups. As Timothy Sisk asserts: In a region experiencing difficult economic conditions and the impact of "modernity" a continuing legacy of corruption, and the resulting social dislocation and despair, Islam promises a renewed meaning and identity. Islam also promises a satisfying indigenous response to widely held feelings of cultural, political and military humiliation blamed on the West (and Israel) even while adopting the Western-inspired appeal of democracy.
This yearning for an authentic model of development and modernization is not distinct to Muslim societies, but is common in many non-Western societies confronted by the power and dominance of westernization and the spread of the global economy.
The Muslim masses in Muslim countries feeling alienated from the ruling classes and institutions means the erosion of the legitimacy of these secular elites. Having a weak legitimacy base, they cannot implement policies that contributed to stable public order. Since the basic rightness of leaders, regimes and political systems are not widely and deeply accepted, regimes fearful of the instability which illegitimacy can generate, compound their problems by denying or restricting political participation. The corruption, nepotism, mismanagement and subservience to Western hegemonic forces, further, alienated the majority, who clinging to their traditions, finds a strong appeal in Islam as an alternative vehicle for political expression. Political Islam is hence at the forefront of challenging the pro-western secular regimes. Having a weak support base, these regimes react by repressing opposition to maintain their hegemony. By using repression and denying opponents, especially Islamists, institutionalized channels of free political expression, these elites are able to stay in power; but at the same time their actions radicalize the Islamists. The authoritarian actions of these regimes with the tacit support of the American government, moreover, weaken their legitimacy in the eyes of the Islamic movements, who see them as willing tools of Western imperialism.
Ironically, to justify their rule and gain more legitimacy amongst the population, ruling secular elites in the Middle East contributed to the Islamic resurgence. In an attempt to counter and check the influence of the Islamic movement, especially the radical wing, secular governments try to justify their rule by co-opting certain symbols and ideas of the revivalists, and also adopting some of their social and cultural agenda. But by encouraging these Islamic symbols, secular governments as Shireen Hunter claims:
Have paradoxically created a more congenial and receptive environment for the militants views. This is particularly so since, while competing with the revivalists in co-opting Islam and using it to their own advantage, Muslim governments continue to muzzle and repress other political forces and groups.
As a result Islam is now transformed into almost the only vehicle for articulating societal concerns, and the only medium of opposition in Arab states. In recent years Muslim movements have assumed the task of repelling external encroachment, enhancing the socioeconomic prospects of the middle and lower classes, and galvanizing the imagination of the educated youth. Islam has a strong popular appeal, and is expected to persist as a movement challenging illegitimate and authoritarian regimes. Repression is unable to put an end to these movements, and as long as the socioeconomic and modernization crisis exists in Arab states, ruling classes in the Middle East will have to resist and confront the opposition of the Islamists.
The Arab Israeli War And Nasserism
Another stimulus to the Islamic revival is the persistent defeats of the Arabs by the Israelis during the 1967 and 1973 wars. Creating an intellectual and spiritual vacuum, and feelings of insecurity, anger, fear and despair, the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, was an important impetus to the contemporary resurgence. Defeat by Israel, shattered the morale, of not only Arabs, but also Muslims all over the world, who felt humiliated and angry by the lost of Jerusalem which is central in Islamic tradition.
Stretching back to the first military defeats of the Ottomans by the Europeans, the 1967 war was part of a long series of setbacks, defeats and humiliation. Ironically the initial modernization process undertaken by Muslim reformers for independence, was an aspiration for military capability to defend their vital interests. After nearly one and a half centuries, this has not been realized, despite billions of dollars in human investments and military hardware. For Arabs, both Muslims and non-Muslims, the existence and the strength of Israel in the heart of the Arab world is a constant reminder of their impotence, failure, dependency and hegemony of the West. The inability of Arab leaders to end Israeli occupation of Arab territory promoted widespread disillusionment, vulnerability, outrage and hopelessness among the Arab masses. Consequently, continued military impotence against Israel reinforced Arab feelings of inferiority generated under European rule.
Muslims felt that they had gone astray, more so their rulers. Seen as a sign that something was wrong in the moral system of society, and as a punishment by God, many Muslims sought refuge in the spiritual and authentic, hence the religious observance, such as the increase in mosque attendance, and modest dressing and veiling by women. Believing that Israel’s strength and success stemmed from religious ideology and commitment, convinced Muslim Arabs that the only way for them to regain their past glory and power was a return to Islam.
Socialism, furthermore, tainted with Islamic symbols, expounded by Abd al- Nasr, lost credibility with Muslim thinkers and masses. The latter saw the hollowness of Nasserism, the ideology that seemed the panacea for the Arabs problems, and was prompted to search for an ideology and program that could be coherent and effective after the humiliating defeat by Israel in 1967. The defeat shattered the pan-Arabist dream, and with it the foundation of Arabism and their collective identity. By the late 1970's it marked the end of pan-Arabism and ideology in the Middle East, and emphasis was now on "pragmatism, regionalism and useful bilateral group alliance." Thus, the old crisis of Arab psycho-spiritual identity reappeared with intensity, creating an intellectual and spiritual vacuum. The desperate search for alternatives centered on revolutionary socialism, western liberalism, and Islamic fundamentalism, with the Islamic way emerging as the dominant alternative during the 1970's.
Throughout the Arab world access to education as a result of development and modernization, and the dissemination of ideas and information stimulated the Islamic resurgence. Access to public education led to a more literate population in the rural and urban areas, who are more exposed through books, newspapers, television and audio-tapes with what was going on in the country, the Muslim world and the world in general. Accordingly, Muslims analyzing these ideas and information give social, political, economic and other issues an Islamic frame and solution. Public education, where it reaches the mass of young people studying their national heritage, past achievements and great civilizations, resulted in the reassertion of a sense of pride among the younger generation in Islam’s historical experience and achievements. Students at universities gained a deeper insight into issues of Islamic law and other matters which was the preserve of the Ulama. All this serves as a counterweight to their feelings of inferiority, westernization and cultural alienation.
Access to education is prevalent among the popular and bazaar classes who make up the majority of the population more attached to traditions of Islam. Part of the Islamic revival is this class getting more access to secondary and higher education, giving them the "moods, contacts and intellectual tools to organize groups." Literacy enables them to read the Koran, religious texts, pamphlets, magazines, books on Islamic law and life that are readily sold in bookstores and on sidewalks. According to Yvonne Haddad, it is clear that in the last two decades, the phenomenal growth in the publications and the dissemination of literature played a key role in many Arab and Muslim countries in increasing the number of people committed to find an Islamic solution to the problems their countries and the global Muslim community face. Furthermore, she observes that the "availability of contemporary commentaries that address current issues has made the Koran more accessible to the general Muslim public, and has made it an important source, not only for devotions and spiritual growth, but for reflection, consciousness and raising politicalization." Like many developing societies, it is clear that the Middle East was not immune to the impact of communication and education which is an important vehicle for social, political and attitudinal change.
The main force behind Islamic revivalism that shaped it into a sociopolitical movement seemed to be composed of elements from the middle and lower urban classes, small bazaar merchants, shopkeepers middle bureaucrat, popular preachers and university students. In the last three decades the ranks of the new middle class expanded remarkably, as a result of development and socioeconomic policies of the state, dwarfing the working class. According to Ayubi, this has been documented for Egypt, Morocco, Iraq and Sudan, and there are also indications that it is true of countries such as Syria, Tunisia, Algeria and others.
These groups are not insignificant in society and are immediate classes falling between the old and middle working classes. Khoury calls them a class caught "in between," composed not so much of those who had been completely passed over by the state and are angry bystanders, but rather of a group who have been pulled by the interventionist state in the direction of modern society to a certain point where they encounter barriers to advancement. This is due to the state’s growing weakness, particularly as a result of its economic policy changes and mismanagement, and the effects of the global economy. Destabilizing them, it reduced the opportunity for mobility of the middle classes and newly created middle class. Accordingly, maintaining their socioeconomic status is difficult, which is aggravated by alienation from the westernized political and economic elites.
Since sociopolitical and economic transformations affect individuals, groups and classes differently in society; support for the Islamic resurgence is often overlapping in its composition. Leonard Binder notes this perceptively when he points out that political Islam is a:
Movement constituted of a loose coalition of bourgeois functions, some rural agrarian capitalists, notable and estate owners, and the virtually proletarianized members of the state employed petite bourgeois the under-employed intelligentsia and the larger student population.
However, within this loose coalition, there is little doubt that the petite bourgeois, intelligentsia and students are the main sponsors and forces behind political Islam who shaped it into a sociopolitical movement. Bazaaris (merchant class) do not form a major component of militant Islamic movements, which is also true of the traditional clergy. Contemporary movements have also not succeeded in attracting the industrial proletariat, peasants, urban poor who were only visible during the Iranian Revolution, according to Ayubi. Political Islam, according to him, is a movement of the "new middle classes" and students. Why has this been so? Ayubi attributes this phenomenon to the rising expectations of the middle classes. In the last three decades the ranks of the new middle class encountered barriers to advancement which is due to the state’s growing weakness and its economic policy changes.
Described as middle class professionals, not normally from the traditional classes, the leadership is lay, rather than clerics, although some come from the disgruntled, politicized religious classes, depending on the political circumstances. They are not medieval figures with long beards as made out in the western media, but sophisticated professionals who are at home in the modern world, and use modern technology such as fax machines and computers to disseminate their message. The Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria is a case in point, where the candidates put forward for the country’s election in 1992 were educated professionals such as engineers, lawyers and academics who control modern institutions like hospitals, schools and large business organizations.
High school, college and university students and graduates are apt to become the most zealous participants in militant Islamic movements. One reason is that secular, western political and development models, and the subsequent crisis in many Middle Eastern countries have contributed to the extreme alienation among Arab youth - psychological insecurity, unemployment, lack of identity, social integrity and loss of national identity vis-à-vis Israel and the West. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the membership of militant Islamic movements includes a high percentage of young people, especially university students and young professionals - many unemployed - males and females. Most of these university students and graduates attracted to Islamic movements are those with technical and scientific backgrounds. Dekmejian cites three reasons for this phenomenon:
In general, Islamic movements are urban based, drawing heavily from the lower middle and middle classes. Revivalists appear to be most effective in reaching recently urbanized of society, particularly the middle and lower middle who have moved to the cities in search of better opportunities and social services. Furthermore, activists are upwardly mobile and non peasants, combining traditional with modern education. Graduates of Middle Eastern, European and American universities, Islamists come from the villages and cities, are pious, highly motivated, and are professionals from all walks of life - teachers, professor, military officials, bureaucrats, lawyers and engineers. Orientated toward Islam, they are committed to social and political activism as a means of bringing about a more Islamic society or system of government. This phenomenon is reflected, and often dominance of Islamists, in professional associations of lawyers, engineers and physicians.
General Thoughts And Ideology Of Islamic Movements
In a religious context, Islamic revivalist politics is a phenomenon seeking to return to the basic foundation of faith, but it does not always imply blind imitation of classical Islam. In fact, influencing the ideological orientation of contemporary Islamic movements are modern ideologies of development, such as socialism and capitalism. These alien influences, however, are not commonly acknowledged by these activists, who attribute them to Islamic origins. Most Sunni movements in the Arab world have also come to share general characteristics of Islamists thoughts (fikrah) and knowledge (aqidah). These are mostly drawn from the teachings of 20th century Muslim activists and thinkers, such as Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (1929) in Egypt; Syed al- Qutb (1906-1966), leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960's; and Maududi, founder of the Jamat-i-Islam, in Pakistan.
Now that the nature and dynamics of the Islamic resurgence of Islam have been identified, we should highlight some of the major issues and aspirations on which revivalism focused. The Islamic Revivalism is a movement of the masses who seek greater political participation, wishing to shape the changes in their economic and social conditions. The contemporary revivalist movements depict Islam and Muslims as being surrounded by a number of hostile forces, bent on their destruction, ranging from Zionist and western conspiracies, to anti-Islamic ideologies, such as Marxism, materialism and secularism. Strong anti-western sentiments are expressed, because of the dismal record of French and Anglo-American actions in the Middle East. Their focus of criticism, and even confrontation, is aimed at the United States who surpassed the role of Britain and France as the main imperialist power in the region in the last half of the century. These movements, furthermore, see that Muslims have been exploited, their culture despised and their history ignored and marginalized in world affairs. By challenging this kind of perceptions, the revivalists seek to liberate Muslims from outside forces, bolster self confidence and create a dynamic society, whose future and present are defined by themselves, rather than by outsiders. Accordingly, they want to be taken seriously, and be recognized as a force to participate as a power in world affairs; a position they believe was usurped with Western destruction of the Ottoman Empire.
As the dominant imperialist power in the Middle East, Islamic movements express anger at the US for its double standards and contempt toward Muslims. In the one instance they see the US support pro-western authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt who are subservient to US interests, but vilify, demonize and show aggression against Muslim movements when it is perceived as independent and against their interests. They identify the hypocrisy of US policies - support of authoritarian regimes in the region where the democratic right of Muslims for self determination, expression and feelings of the vast majority of the population in countries such as Algeria, Palestine and Egypt are denied. Democracy, human rights, self determination is okay for people in Eastern Europe, Latin America, China and Cuba, but not for Muslims, they argue. All these hypocritical policies and actions of the US fuel the hostility of these movements toward this superpower. The unequivocal support by the latter toward Israel against the rights of Arab Muslims is not overlooked, since Israel is seen as an outpost of Western imperialism, planted in the heart of the Muslim world. The revivalists first line of attack is, however, not the West, but the secular ruling elites of their countries, who are seen as agents of Western interests and powers, and the enemies of Islam, having failed to defend the Islamic culture against western penetration and onslaughts, the removal of these classes is central to the Islamists objectives. At the same time these movements show a growing intolerance of religious minorities, particularly Christians, who are identified historically with European and secular elite foreign capital, and who have really become more conspicuous and aggressive in their role as middlemen, export and import merchants and leaders in the service sector, all because of economic liberalization. In the area of economics, revivalists are hostile to Western capital, whether in the form of loans or investments by Multinational Corporations, which are seen as economically harmful and perpetuating dependency; yet even though they oppose Western capital, they are not anti-capitalist, or against private property.
The majority if not all of the movements seek the creation of an Islamic state; hence, there is a call for the implementation of Islamic law (sharia) in public life such as the prohibition of alcohol, gambling, segregation of the sexes and the like. As an opposition and alternate to the secular ruling cliques, Islamic groups are organized into parties with leadership, political and socioeconomic programs, with mouthpieces of propaganda, such as newspapers and radio stations. Their programs seem to be a mixture of modern and traditional ideas. Describing their ideas, Yapp points out that their programs are very crude and superficial, and are characterized by contradictory principles. But these contradictions are not seen as major problems, for they are less concerned with philosophical consistency than with practical action, and they exhibit a surprising pragmatism.
Since an Islamic order is one of their main objectives, the secular regime is regarded as the main obstacle, and on the social, political and economic policies the state is therefore challenged. It does not mean they are against modernization; but demand that it should not imitate and be subservient to the Western model, which they see as undermining the identity and moral fabric of Muslim societies. A modernization model focusing on Islam, which is culturally authentic, stressing self-reliance, and seeking indigenous solutions to their problems is emphasized. It must be noted that this quest for autonomy and cultural authenticity is not limited to Muslim societies nor Islamic groups in their society. Widespread in the Third World where traditional cultures feel threatened by the spread of Western culture, itself often as a result of political domination, themes such as collectivism, nationalism and self sufficiency were common in the Third World before the emergence of Islamic revolutionary movements. Throughout the Revivalists literature dealing with education, law, science, politics and language, their quest for authenticity is reflected.
In the economic sphere Islamists advocate a more interventionist state, and a program for more rapid industrialization. On the one hand they wish to forbid the taking of interest, and on the other hand they wish to devise a satisfactory system for the allocation of funds for investments. Even though they are against western financial institutions, they need western technology and investment to modernize their societies. An important discourse of Muslim movements is the role of women in society. In general the call is for the segregation of women in society, restricted to the home, having the responsibility of caring and nurturing the children (the next Islamic generation) but on the other hand they see the necessity of women to partake in a modern economy. Most of them are unclear about the nature of the Islamic government they wish to establish; whether it should be a pluralistic government where all ideas, whether secular or atheism is tolerated; or if it should be based on classical Islamic thought where, for example, non-Muslims are treated as second class citizens. These issues are a constant debate in their ranks, and have even led to the splintering of Islamic movements regarding interpretation and strategies about the type of an Islamic social order they wish to establish.
From the discussion several general points emerge. Firstly, a revival of Islamic traditions clearly occurred. Muslims exhibit more consciousness of Islamic values, and traditions and the observation of Islamic practices, not only in their daily life, but in the political, social and economic spheres. Although Islam may be interpreted differently by all the people motivated by Islamic zeal, revivalists believe that Islam, not secular ideologies shape their actions, attitudes and beliefs. Secondly, even though the reasons for the resurgence are multidimensional, and may differ from country to country, common catalysts and concerns are identifiable, which are the variety of discontents associated with the development and modernization process. Migration from the countryside to the cities is a key factor, so is unemployment, unfulfilled social and economic promises by the secular state, inadequate social services, foreign dependency, high inflation, and other factors which made people frustrated with the secular ruling classes. For them the western models have not brought the socioeconomic benefits and psychological strengths to their societies; consequently they looked at their traditions, which is Islam, as a solution to their problems.
Partly because of discontents by the popular masses, many Muslims attempted to make Islam politically relevant to affect change in society. No real coordination among revivalists exists, nor are Islamic movements monolithic and controlled by a central body or international Comintern. Although the appeal to Islamic values, the sense of deprivation and anomie, and inspiration drawn from the Iranian revolution are common elements, the form that the revival takes, and the effects it produces, varies according to place and circumstances.
However, the emotional and militant nature of the revival has captured most attention in the West, generating negative images and exacerbating stereotypes about Islam. Paying more attention to a resurgent Islam, many western strategists and the media identify it as a new enemy of the West now that the Cold War is over. But the preceding discussion identifies clearly that the revival is a result of an internal crisis environment encountered by the Arab world, not threatening western Europe or the US. Islamists (in and out of power) are more concerned about dealing with their practical problems of developing the social, political and economic expectations of their societies. But what of militant Islam? Is there an international Islamic threat to the West? Will a clash of civilizations between the Islamic world and the West occur? Or is this idea of a threat a myth, perpetuated by certain interest groups in the West to implement certain foreign policy objectives? In order to assess these issues and claims made by influential pundits in the West, we need to explore who, and why certain individuals, groups, and vested interests are fanning this idea. Then we need to analyze these claims to see whether it has any truth, logic or objectivity.