Many social scientists in the 20th century argued that the expansion of modernization and development would reduce the decline of religious beliefs and commitments, and diminish individual attachment to religious values. Modernization and development theorists in the West assumed that as societies became more exposed to urbanization, technological advances, industrialization, as well as the formation of new and more complex social organizations, it would inevitably lead to the spread of secularism, pluralism and political differentiation throughout the world. The spread of modernization, these academics believed, would loosen traditional religious influence over various cultures, ceasing to play a role, or be a force to mobilize social control, becoming simply a private matter for the individual.
The idea of separation of religion and politics originated in the West, where the experience proved that development, modernization and industrialization, led to secularization of society, which would be irreversible. The belief held that this Western encounter would be a universal phenomenon, spreading in many parts of the world. Viewed within this paradigm religion was seen as part of a primitive culture, retrogressive, and reactionary, where the impact of modernization would undermine these institutions and traditions.
More advanced and developed than other civilizations in social organization, science, economic well-being, technology and other areas of modern life, Western paradigms of development and modernization allured many ruling elites in the Third World. Liberated from colonial dominance these elites chose and implemented these secular models in their societies. Believing it to be the most desirable path to development, they viewed these models as appropriate and superior, because of the technological, military and economic strengths of the West. Using nationalism, rather than religion, citizens were now mobilized politically, socially, economically and for nation building. Where religion influenced and played a major role in the lives of the populace, it was slowly, and sometimes violently, removed from public life, and replaced with socialist, liberal and secular norms. In many cases secular ruling elites manipulated religious symbols in the post-independence era to gain popular support, and religion, although playing a major role in the anti colonial struggle, was not seen as a serious challenge to the secular model.
The Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979, however, brought sudden realization to social scientists in the West of the ongoing power of religion in the contemporary world. Experts and scholars of modernization and development theory now had to reassess their ideas about secularization. Not confined to the Muslim world, this religious resurgence in the last two decades, also manifested itself in the United States (US), Latin America and other areas of the Third World, seriously undermining many widely held assumptions of modernization. Industrialization, urbanization and advancement in education did not lead to a decline in the importance of religion as many development scholars predicted. On the contrary, the rapid transformation of society, resulting from modernization and development, led to a reversed interest in traditional religious values in some parts of the world.
Islam, of all the resurgent religious movements in the world, continues to be the most dominant force in politics and culture, not only in the Orient, but also in Western society; and given the history of the Islamic world, Islam can now function as the major alternative to Western capitalist hegemony. The revivalist wave, inaccurately called "Islamic Fundamentalism," finds expression mostly in social and cultural terms. The results are an increase in popular demands for stricter application of Islamic law (Sharia), code of ethics in public life, and a growing willingness by individuals to apply Islamic principles in their daily lives.
In the last decade the Islamic resurgence signaled some more broad-based phenomena, with events such as the Islamic Salvation Front in Jordan scoring impressive victories in the municipal elections, and the Welfare Party becoming the ruling party in Turkey. These events were signs of the growing normalization and institutionalization of Islamic activism for sociopolitical change in Muslim societies. Clearly becoming part of Islam and Muslim life, the force of Islamic revivalism generated new Islamic oriented elites and institutions, ranging from Islamic schools and universities, to banks, clinics, day-care centers and agricultural projects.
Despite being a reaction in certain Middle Eastern nations against domestic crisis of modernization, the Islamic revivalist movement preoccupies policy makers and ruling classes in the US and western Europe. The latter see Islam as the only ideological alternative and challenge to its global hegemony; perceiving it as politically and economically at odds with Western interests in the region. But the resurgence is a diverse and complex phenomena, being an effort to define the place of Muslims and Islam in the modern world and international affairs. However, the challenge of shaping a "culturally authentic" response to a world order, shaped and dominated by the West, is not unique to Muslims; it is indeed the challenge facing all of the formerly colonized non-Western societies that comprise the Third World. The Islamic revivalism, in fact, cannot be understood if separated from the broader phenomena of alternative developmental and political solutions which some non-western societies, within the context of their traditions, culture and sociopolitical milieu, are searching for.
Historical Context Of Islamic Revivalism
The idea of a revival would be misleading if it implied that Islamic zeal and activity of Muslims are new. The political aspect of Islam is evident in history, and its beginning as a religion saw the establishment of a political community with the prophet Muhammad as its leader. Throughout Muslim history Islamic revivalism was common where protest groups and charismatic individuals revolted against the existing status quo. Revival is thus part of a historical experience within Muslim societies over the centuries where Islamic feeling and sentiments always existed. The present reaction of Muslim revivalists cannot be detached from the traditions they reaffirm; both are important to the contemporary revivalists experience, and neither can be ignored if that experience is to be understood. Part of a broader historical tradition, the contemporary Islamic revivalism is a new phenomena and different to the ones preceding it. The present revival "is a special response to the particular conditions of the late 20th century and must be seen in the context of the conflicts and challenges of the modern world."
A crucial feature of the recent resurgence is the response to the modernization process of the last three and a half decades. The first desire to modernize in the Middle East was the result of direct European intrusion, particularly military expeditions, into the Muslim world from the early 19th century. Early modernizes, such as Muhammad Ali Pasha’s reign (1805 -1809) in Egypt, felt they could borrow selectively from western civilization, such as military technology, without disturbing their society’s equilibrium. The initial process of modernization was, therefore, a narrow borrowing of new military organizations and technology, but the reforms affected other institutions, such as education, law and economics. Not, however, producing the desired results of strengthening Muslim societies against European encroachment, a perception developed about the reforms inadequacy. Accordingly, many concluded that the whole social and political structure had to be overhauled and westernized. Many leaders and intellectuals in the Middle East thought that emulating the Europe was the only way to greatness, power and success; hence secular western paradigms of government were seen as the logical step to modernize the region.
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, after the first world war marked a significant chapter in the triumph of secular nationalism. Emerging as the most important idea in the Middle East, Arabs searched for new political, economic, social and cultural alternatives and solutions as the region divided into independent national states. Enthralled by European power, development and achievement, ruling elites in the Middle East, educated in Western institutions, particularly Britain and France, initiated modernization and developmental projects based on Western models. Despite limited effects of modernization on the majority of Muslims in the Middle East, a secular political theory, derived entirely from the West, and resting on the concepts of constitutionalism, consultative or representative government, nationalism and popular sovereignty, evolved in the latter part of the 19th century, gaining rapid acceptance among the emerging social groups. Nationalism now redefined the community, and written constitutions with legislation flowing from newly established parliaments expressed popular sovereignty. All these western concepts of political organization and government were a great blow to the classical theory of Islamic polity based on the universal ummah (global Muslim community). Nationalism - harmful to the Islamic concept of the universal ummah, - and the secular principles at the level of state, replaced the notion of the sovereignty of God and Islamic Sharia in the public sphere.
However, modernization programs, new techniques, and institutions affected and benefited only a small segment of society, schooled in Western institutions, having adopted western values. The elite’s inability to communicate with the masses created barriers, making them loose touch with the tradition and culture of the people. Alienated from the Westernized secular ruling cliques, the majority of people in the Middle East still clung tenaciously to their traditional beliefs and practices. As the commitment of these elites to the welfare of their constituencies and anti-colonial struggles faded, notes Alan Taylor:
They became increasingly inclined to reach compromise agreements with the colonial powers, helping to preserve a high degree of British and French influence in the area. This led in the 1930's to them being discredited as responsible warders of the national order.
Discredited by the masses, seen as agents of European imperialism and unable to deliver the promises of development and modernisation, strong and violent forces opposed them, forcing many of these ruling classes out of power.
These initial shortcomings of secular nationalism in the first half of the 20th century led to the emergence of Arab Nationalism in the 1950's and 1960's. Aspiring toward a closer union of the Arab countries, independence from the superpowers and social reforms for greater equality, this idea was embodied for a time in the popularity of Gamal abd al-Nasr, ruler of Egypt in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Responding to the challenges of decolonization and underdevelopment, pan-Arabism in many cases fused Islamic values with socialism, thinking it would help mobilize the masses to eradicate underdevelopment. Common in many parts of the Third World at this time, enchantment with socialism was a reaction to European colonialism and imperialism, identifying the latter with capitalism. Some ruling elites, for example in Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen, advocated a pure secular socialism, while Gamal abd al-Nasr in Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi, ruler of Libya, fused it with Islamic traditions and symbols. Ushering in a new era of development, modernization and state formation in the Middle East, these ruling classes were popular with the masses, who believed that these populists would solve their nation’s problems, deliver the socioeconomic goods and liberate them from Western dependency.
Character Of The Modern Secular State
The new elites, who during violent struggles and political intrigues in the 1950's and 1960's took over the Arab countries like Egypt, Iraq and Syria, forged the modern secular states in the Middle East. These new elites - civilian, military, radical nationalists and socialists, - shifted from nationalism to correspond and accommodate the rapid social and economic changes that had taken place in the Arab society. According to Khoury the priorities they stressed were:
Socioeconomic justice, rather than constitutionalism, liberal parliamentary forces and personal freedoms. Their vocabulary had socialist undertones: mass education, a national welfare program rapid industrialization through the agency of the state. Second, these new forces rekindled the flame of Arab unity, which they accused the old of forsaking. They refused to accept the artificial state frontiers imposed by the colonial powers which ran against the very grain of Arab nationalist ideologies, and they blamed the rulers for willfully contri-buting to the loss of Palestine in 1948.
Their goal was to bring their societies into the modern world and forge a new basis of loyalty in society: to the nation. Although the process of state formation, development and modernization were different in all these countries depending on the political economy and socioeconomic conditions, a number of features were common. All developed a large state bureaucracy, built large repressive security apparatus - police, army, intelligence networks,- centralized the economy, and created large welfare programs. In the 1950's and 1960's there was also an important shift away from the preoccupation with achieving immediate political goals, such as struggling against vestiges of imperialism, toward concentrating on economic and social development.This trend, manifesting itself over an extended period, took more or less time in various parts of the Middle East.
In states like Syria, Libya, Algeria and Egypt, the regime dismantled the power base of the old ruling class through land reforms. Initiating developmental and modernization projects, the new ruling cliques stressed industrialization over agriculture; expanded its control over national economic resources; brought education to the masses in the urban and rural areas and created a one party system under firm state control. Religious institutions and the role of the ulama (religious scholars) were, furthermore, weakened and brought under state control. For example, after Nasser took over power in Egypt, Bromley points out:
The new secular regime also moved against the position of religion seeking to subordinate it to state control. In 1952 family waqfs were abolished, the public ones brought under state control in 1957. The sharia courts were closed in 1956, Sufi Brotherhoods were officially outlawed in 1961 and orthodox ulama cooperated with the state.
Urbanization was another phenomena taking place during this period, and although not planned by the state, it expanded identified with progress. This unprecedented growth in urbanization, straining and contributing to the exhaustion of the secular state, is a major reason for the Islamic resurgence. In the fifties and sixties these regimes, supported by their populations, appeared to be managing socioeconomic development and keeping foreign domination to a minimum. However, by the early 1970's, socioeconomic development began to fall and slowed the state’s ability to modernize. At the same time, as a weak economic and political entity dependent on the West, the Arab states in the 1970's felt pressures from the former to make political and ideological compromises. It was to attract hard loans, foreign capital and investment to regenerate the sluggish economy and spur industrial and other socioeconomic development. The neglect of agriculture was another factor "exhausting" (to use Khoury’s term) the state with dire consequences, as many regimes had to import food, relying on foreign earnings to finance imports. Moreover, land reforms initiated by the new governments, though destroying the economic base of the old ruling class, did not benefit the mass of the peasantry. Uprooting thousands, they flocked to the cities such as Cairo, Tunis, Istanbul and Algiers settling in shanty towns on the periphery, exacerbating the problems of an overburdened city with limited resources and services. This "overarching context of economic crisis and political failure," provides one of the "crucial condition for what is mistakenly referred to as Islamic Fundamentalism."